



# The Lugar Report on National Security

By Dick Lugar, United States Senator, Indiana • Summer 2004

## Lugar Lists the Twelve Most Critical Non-proliferation Objectives

*U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dick Lugar delivered an address at the National Press Club on August 11, 2004, in which he enumerated a dozen non-proliferation breakthroughs that the next president must pursue.*

*Below are excerpts from the speech:*

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been the number one national security dilemma confronting the United States. After many years, the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent public discovery of al-Qaeda's methods, capabilities, and intentions finally brought our vulnerability to the forefront.

The War on Terrorism proceeds in a world awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials. Most of these weapons and materials are stored in the United States and Russia, but they also exist in India, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Israel, Great Britain, France, China, and perhaps other nations.

We must anticipate that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. The minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any terrorist cell from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. We must make certain that all sources of WMD are identified and systematically guarded or destroyed.

### The Nunn-Lugar Program

To combat the WMD threat in the former Soviet Union, our country has implemented the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Since enactment in late 1991, Nunn-Lugar has devoted American technical expertise and money for joint efforts to

safeguard and destroy materials and weapons of mass destruction. To date, the weapons systems deactivated or destroyed by the United States under these programs include:

- 6,312 nuclear warheads;
- 537 ICBMs;
- 459 ICBM silos;
- 11 ICBM mobile missile launchers;
- 128 bombers;
- 708 nuclear air-to-surface missiles;
- 408 submarine missile launchers;
- 496 submarine launched missiles;
- 27 nuclear submarines; and
- 194 nuclear test tunnels.

### **In addition:**

- 260 tons of fissile material have received either comprehensive or rapid security upgrades;
- Security upgrades have been made at some 60 nuclear warhead storage sites;
- 208 metric tons of Highly Enriched Uranium have been blended down to Low Enriched Uranium;
- 35 percent of Russia's chemical weapons have received security upgrades;
- Joint U.S.-Russian research is being conducted at 49 former biological weapons facilities, and security improvements are underway at 4 biological weapons sites;
- The International Science and Technology Centers, of which the United States is the leading sponsor, have engaged 58,000 former weapons scientists in peaceful work;

- The International Proliferation Prevention Program has funded 750 projects involving 14,000 former weapons scientists and created some 580 new peaceful high-tech jobs;
- Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.

These successes were never a foregone conclusion. Today, even after more than twelve years of work, constant vigilance is required to ensure that the Nunn-Lugar program is not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or undercut by political disagreements – either in Russia or the United States.

Although the Russian government has opened a remarkable number of facilities to the Nunn-Lugar program, others



Senator Lugar destroys a gyroscope from an SS-N-8 nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, which was carried aboard a Russian DELTA II submarine.

remain closed. Convincing Russia to accelerate its dismantlement schedules, to conclude umbrella agreements that limit liability for contractors, and to open its remaining closed facilities are the most immediate challenges for Nunn-Lugar. Whoever wins election in November must make the removal of these roadblocks a priority.

Taking Nunn-Lugar Global

In addition, the Nunn-Lugar Program has established a deep reservoir of experience and talent that could be applied to non-proliferation objectives around the world. The original Nunn-Lugar bill was concerned with the former Soviet Union, because that is where the vast majority of weapons and materials of mass destruction were. Today, we must be prepared with money and expertise to extend the Nunn-Lugar concept wherever it can be usefully applied.

I can attest to the energy and imagination of technicians, contract supervisors, equipment operators, negotiators, auditors, and many other specialists who have been willing to live in remote areas of the former Soviet Union to get this job done. This is an instrument begging to be used anywhere that we can achieve diplomatic breakthroughs.

During the last Congress, I introduced the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which allows \$50 million in Nunn-Lugar funding to be used outside the former Soviet Union. President Bush signed the legislation into law in 2003. This Act allows us to take advantage of non-proliferation opportunities wherever they may appear. President Bush has embraced the Nunn-Lugar concept and has endorsed efforts to apply it worldwide. Russia will continue to be a major focus but emerging risks must also be addressed in the Middle East and Asia. In addition, Nunn-Lugar concepts and experience may be valuable

in addressing specific vulnerabilities involving radiological material that could be used in dirty bombs. Nunn-Lugar has developed a unique capability to meet a variety of proliferation threats. But the program needs firm policy guidance and aggressive diplomacy to engage potential partners.

Seeking Breakthroughs in Non-proliferation

So what is the non-proliferation agenda for the winning presidential candidate? In my view, he must bring the full weight of U.S. diplomatic and economic power to bear on pursuing at least the following twelve breakthroughs. Admittedly, this is a daunting list. No President will achieve every objective enumerated here. He will have influence over all of them, but he will have absolute power over none of them. The list illustrates that the uncertain work of non-proliferation requires flexibility, persistence, creativity, and allied cooperation. It also illustrates how many different areas present grave risk to our national security.

**1. Achieve the Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement of North Korea's Nuclear Program.**

North Korea must be the number one non-proliferation priority. It may have as many as six nuclear weapons, and Pyongyang is notorious for selling its weapons technology to anyone with ready cash. To achieve a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program, the North must freeze and disable all its nuclear weapons, components, and facilities, and place all of its fissile material under safeguards. We must also pursue a phased, verifiable agreement to eliminate the weapons program and terminate its export of ballistic missiles. In doing so, we should insist that an exhaustive and creative verification methodology is at the heart of

any agreement. Realistically, I do not expect North Korea to immediately embrace an intrusive inspections and dismantlement program. But the Bush Administration has done the right thing by suggesting using the Nunn-Lugar program as a model for future action.

**2. Establish International Will to End Iran's Nuclear Program.**

Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, no matter how loudly they may deny it. Our challenge is to rally the international community, which largely shares our views on that fact, to apply significant pressure on Tehran to verifiably abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. If Iran does not immediately change course, we should insist that the issue, now before the International Atomic Energy Agency, be referred to the United Nations Security Council for action. To compel Iran to abide by its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which includes submitting to full inspections and safeguards, the Security Council must be prepared to impose the entire range of sanctions --diplomatic, economic, and military.

**3. Bring Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons into the Nunn-Lugar Program.**

For all the successes we have had in dismantling Russian intercontinental missiles and strategic warheads, Moscow refuses even to discuss the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, which in many ways may be even more dangerous. They're more portable, and they're usually stored closer to potential flashpoints. Moscow should fully account for its stocks of tactical nukes as a first step toward bringing them into Nunn-Lugar.

**4. Control Nuclear Materials Worldwide.**

The United States must lead a new effort to contain the weapons grade material

outside the former Soviet Union that poses a threat to international security. We must help develop a comprehensive program that will address each facility that possesses high-risk material, eliminate stockpiles of spent reactor fuel that can be reprocessed, make a risk assessment of the world's scores of research reactors and their vulnerability, and promote efforts to convert research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel. The Bush administration has made an important start with Secretary Abraham's announcement in May of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which is aimed at securing a broad range of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. This will compliment President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative, which expands our ability to interdict illegal shipments of such materials.

**5. Win India and Pakistan Nuclear Agreements.**

The border between India and Pakistan has been called the most dangerous place in the world. We must devote sustained efforts to promote confidence building measures and to support the encouraging steps these two nuclear-armed foes have already taken on their own. We can promote exchanges between Pakistani and Indian security experts, and offer assistance on export controls, border security, and the protection, control and accounting of nuclear arsenals. This will require some diplomatic and administrative skill to stay within our NPT obligations.

**6. Open Russia's Biological Weapons Facilities.**

We are making progress in converting Russia's biological weapons facilities to peaceful uses and in employing its former bioweapons scientists. But there is a major gap in the program: four former Soviet military facilities have not opened their doors to inspection. We must make it a priority to close that gap.



Senator Lugar demonstrates the proliferation threat posed by the chemical weapons at Shchuchye by placing an 85mm chemical shell into an ordinary briefcase.

**7. Secure Full Russian Disclosure of its Chemical Weapons Stockpile.**

While we have made hard-won progress in preparing for the destruction of Russia's 40,000-ton stockpile of known chemical weapons, Russian obstinacy has slowed the process. At Shchuchye, where destruction won't begin until 2007, I saw nearly two million warheads and artillery shells, many of which were so compact they could easily be concealed in a briefcase. But Moscow refuses to disclose the full extent of its chemical weapons stocks, casting a shadow over the program. It makes certification under the Nunn-Lugar program problematic and has

required new legislation and presidential waivers to keep funding on track.

**8. Transform the Russian Bureaucracy to End Roadblocks to Non-proliferation Cooperation.**

Even with adequate funding and high-level agreements, the Nunn-Lugar Program still faces roadblocks erected by Russian bureaucrats and military officers. They have denied access to sites, refused to provide tax-free status to participating countries, and failed to extend the necessary liability protections to G-8 partners, all of which stymies progress. Russia still has 340 tons of fissile material that has not been adequately secured, and 70 warhead sites that need more protection. Our government must keep pressure on President Putin to demand action and make the changes necessary to get it.

**9. Win Focused Commitment from U.S. and European Companies to Engage Weapons Scientists.**

We have long recognized that economic hardship and desperation could drive some weapons scientists into the arms of rogue states or terrorist organizations. The tens of thousands of scientists we have employed are mostly working at government-sponsored or government-subsidized jobs, but a number of American companies have shown the way forward by employing some of these well-trained individuals. We must capitalize on this success by commercializing the process and move many more of these men and women into sustainable private sector

## Twelve Non-proliferation Objectives . . . continued

jobs where they can put their skills to profitable civilian use.

### **10. Secure Russian Ratification of the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement.**

This agreement underpins all U.S. threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. It protects contributions to weapons clean-up from being taxed by Russian authorities, and protects U.S. contractors -- who are doing much of the most difficult work -- from liability in case of an accident or other mishap. Without these guarantees, work would halt. We have negotiated an extension of the agreement, successfully fending off Russian attempts to weaken it. Ratification by the Duma is critical to maintaining a solid foundation for this complex effort, and earlier this year Senator Joe Biden and I wrote a letter to Russian leaders urging quick action. Yet President Putin has so far failed to present the extension for a vote.

### **11. Finalize a Plutonium Disposition Agreement.**

Russia has 134 metric tons of dangerous, long-lived plutonium that is not currently covered by any cooperative threat reduction program. An effort to

destroy this material is still blocked by the same issues of liability, accountability, and access that once hindered the Nunn-Lugar Program on weapons dismantlement.

### **12. Ensure the Fulfillment of Global Partnership Pledges.**

Under President Bush's leadership, the G-8 summit in 2002 formed the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, nicknamed "10 Plus 10 Over 10." The United States agreed to provide \$10 billion in cooperative threat reduction funds over the next 10 years if our partners would add another \$10 billion. We've done our share, and many of our allies are off to an excellent start. But overall, our partners' pledges are \$3 billion short. Moreover, not enough of the money that has been pledged has been allocated for actual Global Partnership projects. We have identified important dismantlement objectives, such as chemical weapons stocks and non-strategic nuclear submarines, which need this funding. Our allies must turn pledges into projects.

I am confident that whoever is elected in November would find substantial public support for this set of

initiatives. The American public wants the President to engage in foreign affairs to improve the security of the United States. A June 2004 New York Times/CBS poll found that 38 percent of Americans surveyed said that foreign policy was "the issue they most wanted to hear the candidates discuss during the campaign." This compared to corresponding polls by the same polling organization that found only 1 percent of Americans in 1996 and 3 percent in 2000 viewed foreign policy as the most important problem facing the country.

The American people expect their government to be working day and night to find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. So do I. Our political leadership and non-proliferation experts must engage Russia to unlock the last doors to the dismantlement of its weapons programs. Further, they should scour the globe to identify and create opportunities to dismantle dangerous weapons programs outside the former Soviet Union. Persistent diplomacy at the highest levels of our government is needed each day if we are to succeed.

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